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THE RETURN OF THE SELF, OR WHATEVER 
HAPPENED TO POSTMODERN 
JURISPRUDENCE? 
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN

 
ABSTRACT 
Postmodern jurisprudence was all the rage in the 1990s. Two of 
the most renowned postmodernists, Stanley Fish and Pierre Schlag, 
both persistently criticized mainstream legal scholars for believing 
they were modernist selves—independent, sovereign, and 
autonomous agents who could remake the social and legal world 
merely by writing a law review article. Then Fish and Schlag turned 
on each other. Each attacked the other for making the same 
mistake: harboring a modernist self. I revisit this skirmish for two 
reasons. First, it helps explain the current moribund state of 
postmodern jurisprudence. If two of the leading postmodernists 
could not avoid embedding a self in their respective writings, then 
what was the point of criticizing mainstream legal scholars for 
doing the same? Second, an understanding of this conflict between 
Fish and Schlag can help suggest a path forward for 
postmodernism. Since 2000, when Fish published his attack against 
Schlag, feminist theorists have developed intertwined concepts of a 
relational self and relational autonomy. These feminist concepts 
provide a springboard for launching postmodern jurisprudence into 
new territory.  
 
 
  Visiting Scholar, Harvard Law School. Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished 
Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Political Science, University of Wyoming. I thank Stanley 
Fish and Pierre Schlag for their comments on earlier drafts and Joshua Eames for his research 
assistance.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Many years ago, Stanley Fish and Pierre Schlag attacked each other’s 
scholarship. Ironically, these two leading postmodern jurisprudents 
accused the other of making the same mistake.
1
 Schlag went first, 
denouncing Fish’s scholarship as harboring a modernist self.2 
Subsequently, Fish turned around and similarly criticized Schlag’s 
scholarship.
3
 
 
 
 
 1. For a history of American jurisprudence, including a discussion of the postmodern era, see 
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN 
INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE (2000) [hereinafter Feldman, VOYAGE]. 
 2. Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO. L.J. 37 
(1987) [hereinafter Schlag, Fish v. Zapp]. Schlag’s other writings include the following: PIERRE 
SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998); PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: 
MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND (1996) [hereinafter SCHLAG, LAYING]; 
Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A Report 
on the State of the Art), 97 GEO. L.J. 803 (2009) [hereinafter Schlag, Spam]; Pierre Schlag, Formalism 
and Realism in Ruins (Mapping the Logics of Collapse), 95 IOWA L. REV. 195 (2009); Pierre Schlag, 
The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047 (2002); Pierre Schlag, Law and 
Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997) [hereinafter Schlag, Phrenology]; Pierre Schlag, Writing 
For Judges, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 419 (1992) [hereinafter Schlag, Writing]; Pierre Schlag, The 
Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1991) [hereinafter Schlag, The Problem]; Pierre 
Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991) [hereinafter Schlag, 
Normativity]; Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990) [hereinafter 
Schlag, Nowhere]; Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. REV. 
1195 (1989) [hereinafter Schlag, Missing Pieces]. 
 3. Stanley Fish, Theory Minimalism, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 761 (2000) [hereinafter Fish, 
Minimalism]. Fish’s other writings include the following: STANLEY FISH, THINK AGAIN (2015); 
STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE (1999) [hereinafter FISH, PRINCIPLE]; STANLEY FISH, 
THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO (1994); STANLEY FISH, 
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I revisit this skirmish for two reasons. First, it helps explain the current 
moribund state of postmodern jurisprudence. Second, it suggests a path 
forward in revitalizing postmodern theory. Postmodernism cannot be 
easily defined. As numerous commentators have observed, however, it can 
most readily be characterized in opposition to modernism.
4
 If modernism 
demands that knowledge be based on firm foundations, that language be 
representational of the external world, and that society be constituted by 
bounded atom-like individuals, then postmodernism is anti-foundational, 
anti-representational, and anti-individualist.
5
 More affirmatively, 
postmodernists tend to study the operation of power in society and its 
institutions, particularly the way power works through language or 
discourse.
6
 
To understand modernism as a counterpoint to postmodernism, 
consider the children’s book, Harold and the Purple Crayon.7 Harold is a 
small boy with a round head, wispy strands of hair, and plain white 
sleeper-pajamas. Wherever he goes, Harold carries a purple crayon, and 
with that crayon, he literally makes his world. If Harold wants to stroll 
down “a long straight path,”8 he draws a line and walks along it. When 
Harold falls into the sea, he draws a boat and sets sail. When Harold tires 
of sailing, he draws land and steps ashore. In the end, when Harold grows 
 
 
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989) [hereinafter FISH, NATURALLY]; Stanley Fish, Dennis 
Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987) [hereinafter Fish, Dennis Martinez]; 
Stanley Fish, Change, 86 SOUTH ATLANTIC Q. 423 (1987) [hereinafter Fish, Change]; Stanley Fish, 
Consequences, 11 CRITICAL INQUIRY 433 (1985) [hereinafter Fish, Consequences]; Stanley Fish, Fish 
v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984) [hereinafter Fish, Fiss]; Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain 
Gang: Interpretation in the Law and in Literary Criticism, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 201 (1982) 
[hereinafter Fish, Chain Gang]; Stanley Fish, Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision, 60 TEX. L. REV. 
495 (1982); STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 1 (1980) [hereinafter FISH, CLASS]; 
Stanley Fish, Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the 
Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes Without Saying, and Other Special Cases, 4 CRITICAL INQUIRY 
625 (1978). 
 4. NANCEY MURPHY, ANGLO-AMERICAN POSTMODERNITY 1 (1997); Dennis Patterson, 
Introduction, in POSTMODERNISM AND LAW, at xi, xiixiv (1994). 
 5. Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 254, 26279 (1992); 
Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and its Implications for Statutory 
Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 250809 (1992). 
 6.  Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality 81102 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978); Michel 
Foucault, Discipline and Punish 2631 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) [hereinafter Foucault, Discipline]; 
see Steven Best & Douglas Kellner, The Postmodern Turn 25560 (1997) (identifying four 
postmodern themes); Feldman, Voyage, supra note 1, at 3745, 13787 (characterizing 
postmodernism in accord with eight overlapping themes). 
 7. CROCKETT JOHNSON, HAROLD AND THE PURPLE CRAYON (1955). This book is not paginated, 
so I do not cite to specific page numbers. 
 8. Id. 
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sleepy, he makes his bed. He climbs in and draws up the covers. Warm 
and cozy, Harold drifts off to sleep. 
Harold exemplifies the modernist self, a “legislator-in-chief.”9 He is an 
independent and autonomous agent exercising sovereign control over 
himself and his world. His enormous power to choose and act is not 
dependent on or limited by social relationships.
10
 He is completely self-
reliant. 
As postmodernists, neither Fish nor Schlag would like Harold. In fact, 
they devoted much of their respective careers to criticizing traditional legal 
scholars for believing that they and their readers were little Harolds. 
Traditional legal scholars, Fish and Schlag argued, acted like modernist 
selves, as if they could change the legal and social world as easily as 
Harold could draw a picture. Traditional legal scholars wrote reams of 
articles and books, sketching elaborate theories, articulating precise 
principles, and recommending judicial outcomes. These scholars believed 
their writings actually produced positive social and legal change, yet they 
were mistaken, as Fish and Schlag repeatedly declared. To be sure, these 
scholars generated more theories, principles, and recommendations, but 
rather than changing the world for the better, these scholars and their 
earnest writings merely reassured themselves that they and their readers 
were modernist selves.
11
 
Given that Fish and Schlag agreed on so much, why did they ultimately 
turn on each other? As I explain, one cannot write jurisprudential 
scholarship without revealing a self, despite best efforts. Even so, 
scholarship over the last fifteen years demonstrates that Fish and Schlag 
too quickly attached certain assumptions to the concept of the self. Recent 
scholarship has sketched a relational self that can exercise a degree of 
autonomy without declaring its independent sovereignty. Indeed, in the 
year 2000, when Fish published his attack on Schlag, feminist theorists 
published an anthology articulating a concept of a relational self and 
exploring its implications for autonomy.
12
 This volume, entitled Relational 
Autonomy, initiated an outburst of scholarly activity elaborating on the 
 
 
 9. See Zygmunt Bauman & Rein Raud, Practices of Selfhood 3 (2015). 
 10. Id. at 13; See also PHILIP CUSHMAN, CONSTRUCTING THE SELF, CONSTRUCTING AMERICA 
3033 (1995); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 14398 (1989). 
 11. Fish’s and Schlag’s arguments will be elaborated in the text. See, e.g., Schlag, Nowhere, 
supra note 2; Fish, Dennis Martinez, supra note 3. 
 12. RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTOMONY, AGENCY, AND THE 
SOCIAL SELF (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000). Of course, some feminist theorists 
had previously discussed issues related to women’s agency and autonomy. E.g., Kathryn Abrams, Sex 
Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995). 
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concepts of the relational self and relational autonomy.
13
 In this Article, I 
draw on this recent feminist scholarship to explain how this relational self 
can resuscitate postmodern jurisprudence more generally.
14
 
Part I of this Article sets forth the main critical positions of Fish and 
Schlag. Part II examines how Fish and Schlag turned their respective 
critical gazes on each other. Part III explains the concept of the relational 
or postmodern self, and Part IV briefly explores some implications of this 
reconceived self. 
I. FISH AND SCHLAG CRITICIZE TRADITIONAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
A. Fish and Interpretive Practices 
For at least four centuries, starting in the 1600s, modernist (western) 
metaphysics sharply split an independent and autonomous self from an 
external and objective world.
15
 To have knowledge, the self somehow 
needed to bridge the gap between itself and the objects of the external 
world.
16
 If the self could not bridge the gap either by directly accessing or 
mirroring in consciousness the objective world, then the self would be 
doomed to relativism, nihilism, and solipsism. Consequently, when it 
came to hermeneutics—the understanding and interpretation of a text—the 
self supposedly would need to directly access the objective meaning of the 
text. The textual meaning, that is, was an object that could be known, but 
only if one could apply a method or technique to overcome one’s 
preexisting prejudices that otherwise would obscure the true meaning of 
the text. For instance, some constitutional theorists—now referred to as 
old originalists—insisted that in order to understand the objective meaning 
of a constitutional provision, a judge would need to ascertain the framers’ 
 
 
 13. See Paul Benson, Feminist Commitments and Relational Autonomy, in AUTONOMY, 
OPPRESSION, AND GENDER 87, 87 (Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper eds., 2014) (emphasizing the 
importance of the Relational Autonomy volume). Some helpful books published subsequently include 
the following (listed chronologically): MARILYN FRIEDMAN, AUTONOMY, GENDER, POLITICS (2003); 
JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY AND LAW 
(2011); THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: TRANSFORMING SUBJECTIVITIES AND 
NEW FORMS OF RESISTANCE (Maria Pallotta-Chiarolli & Bob Pease eds., 2014); AUTONOMY, 
OPPRESSION, AND GENDER (Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper eds., 2014); PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND 
SOCIAL OPPRESSION: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Marina A.L. Oshana ed., 2015). 
 14. See Rosalind Dixon, Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) Recast, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 277, 278 (2008) (underscoring that recent feminist scholarship is often disregarded). 
 15. See Feldman, VOYAGE, supra note 1, at 1528 (discussing the development of modernist 
metaphysics). 
 16. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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intentions when they originally wrote that provision.
17
 Any judge who 
failed to follow this or some other ostensibly methodical or mechanical 
process for ascertaining objective constitutional meaning would 
necessarily become an unconstrained “rogue judge.”18 From this modernist 
perspective, interpretation presents us with an either/or: Either we access 
objective textual meaning, or we freely impose on the text whatever 
meaning we subjectively prefer. 
Typical of postmodernists, Fish sought to dissolve the dilemma of this 
either/or.
19
 According to Fish, neither “the independent or uninterpreted 
text”—that is, objectivity—nor “the independent and freely interpreting 
reader”—that is, free-floating subjectivity—is possible.20 Objectivity is 
impossible, because we always are already interpreting. Neither the text, 
the author’s (such as the constitutional framers’) intentions, nor anything 
else is accessible as brute data or, in other words, as an uninterpreted 
objective source of meaning.
21
 Yet subjectivity also is impossible, because 
the individual interpreter or reader is never unconstrained—never free 
merely to impose her personally preferred meanings on the text. The 
interpreter, Fish explained, always is constrained by the practices of her 
“interpretive community,”22 which impart “assumed distinctions, 
 
 
 17. Focusing on the original public meaning is referred to as ‘new originalism,’ while focusing 
on framers’ intentions is ‘old originalism.’ Stephen M. Feldman, Constitutional Interpretation and 
History: New Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 283, 28486 (2014). For examples of 
old originalism, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Robert H. Bork, Neutral 
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). For illustrations of new 
originalism, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 38 (1997); ROBERT BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA 6, 14344 (1990). 
 18. J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1141 (1991). 
 19. Fish argued that his interpretivist approach resolved “a question that had long seemed crucial 
to literary studies. What is the source of interpretive authority: the text or the reader?” Fish, Change, 
supra note 3, at 423; see Feldman, VOYAGE, supra note 1, at 2939 (explaining the postmodern 
rejection of the modernist either/or of epistemological foundationalism). 
 20. Fish, Chain Gang, supra note 3, at 21112. 
 21. “[T]here is no such thing as literal meaning, if by literal meaning one means a meaning that 
is perspicuous no matter what the context and no matter what is in the speaker’s or hearer’s mind, a 
meaning that because it is prior to interpretation can serve as a constraint on interpretation.” FISH, 
NATURALLY, supra note 3, at 4. 
 22. Fish wrote: 
At this point it looks as if the text is about to be dislodged as a center of authority in favor of 
the reader whose interpretive strategies make it; but I forestall this conclusion by arguing that 
the strategies in question are not his in the sense that would make him an independent agent. 
Rather, they proceed not from him but from the interpretive community of which he is a 
member; they are, in effect, community property, and insofar as they at once enable and limit 
the operations of his consciousness, he is too.… [I]t is interpretive communities, rather than 
either the text or the reader, that produce meanings and are responsible for the emergence of 
formal features. Interpretive communities are made up of those who share interpretive 
strategies not for reading but for writing texts, for constituting their properties. In other words 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/7
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categories of understanding, and stipulations of relevance and 
irrelevance.”23 Thus, for the same reason that objectivity is impossible—
because we always are already interpreting—unconstrained subjectivity 
likewise is impossible. No interpreter ever stands prior to or outside of 
interpretive practices, which always and necessarily limit one’s 
interpretation of any text, including the Constitution. In short, the practices 
of an interpretive community simultaneously enable and limit textual 
understanding: An interpretive community organizes the world for its 
members by relating phenomena “to the interests and goals that make the 
community what it is.”24 
Once we accept Fish’s conceptualization of textual interpretation, then 
the notion of specifying some method or mechanical process for 
ascertaining objective meaning, such as discovering the framers’ 
intentions, becomes vacuous.
25
 There is no pure objective meaning and no 
free-floating subjective interpreter, so no method can possibly bridge an 
ostensible gap between the two (because the gap does not exist). Fish 
therefore criticized numerous jurisprudents, including Ronald Dworkin, 
who sought to explain why and how legal interpretation and judicial 
decision making are objective.
26
 A judge cannot follow the law by 
mechanically ascertaining the meaning of a legal rule, as embodied in the 
Constitution or some other legal text, and then applying that rule to the 
instant case. To the contrary, Fish explained: 
The very ability to formulate a [judicial] decision in terms that 
would be recognizably legal depends on one’s having internalized 
the norms, categorical distinctions, and evidentiary criteria that 
make up one’s understanding of what the law is. That understanding 
is developed in the course of an educational experience whose 
materials are the unfolding succession of cases, holdings, dissents, 
 
 
these strategies exist prior to the act of reading and therefore determine the shape of what is 
read rather than, as is usually assumed, the other way around. 
FISH, CLASS, supra note 3, at 1314. 
 23. Fish, Change, supra note 3, at 42324. 
 24. Id. at 433. “[T]here has never been nor ever will be anyone who could survey interpretive 
possibilities from a vantage point that was not itself already interpretive.” Fish, Dennis Martinez, 
supra note 3, at 1795. 
 25. Fish, Consequences, supra note 3, at 437. 
 26. Fish, Chain Gang, supra note 3 (criticizing Dworkin); see Ronald Dworkin, Law as 
Interpretation, in The Politics of Interpretation 249 (William J.T. Mitchell ed., 1983) (explaining law 
as interpretation). Owen Fiss had attempted to appropriate Fish’s ideas on interpretation to help 
explain the constraints imposed on judges. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. 
REV. 739 (1982) (relying on Stanley Fish to develop views on law and interpretation). Fish thought 
that Fiss had seriously misunderstood his ideas. Fish, Fiss, supra note 2. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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legislative actions, etc., that are the stuff of law school instruction 
and of the later instruction one receives in a clerkship or as a junior 
associate.
27
 
Fish furthered his criticism of legal scholarship by arguing that theory has 
no consequences. He defined theory as “an abstract or algorithmic 
formulation that guides or governs practice from a position outside any 
particular conception of practice.”28 A theory “is something a practitioner 
consults when he wishes to perform correctly, with the term ‘correctly’ 
here understood as meaning independently of his preconceptions, biases, 
or personal preferences.”29 If one accepts Fish’s notion of textual 
interpretation—if we are always and already interpreting—then his 
denigration of theory necessarily follows (assuming one also accepts his 
definition of theory). If a theory must give “explicit instructions that 
[leave] no room for interpretive decisions,”30 or require an individual to 
“[surrender] his judgment … in order to reach conclusions that in no way 
depend on his education, or point of view, or cultural situation,”31 then 
theory becomes impossible. Nothing—and that includes theory—can be 
outside of or prior to interpretation. And that is exactly Fish’s point: 
Theory must fail. Pushing his argument to an extreme conclusion, Fish 
declared that theory “is entirely irrelevant to the practice it purports to 
critique and reform.”32 
Most important for legal scholarship, then, Fish argued that theories of 
adjudication have nothing to do with the practice of adjudication. 
“[J]udging or doing judging is one thing and giving accounts or theories of 
judging is another.…”33 Regardless of what theories we advocate—
whether originalist or natural law or anything else—judges do the same 
 
 
 27. FISH, NATURALLY, supra note 3, at 360. 
 28. Fish, Dennis Martinez, supra note 3, at 1779. 
 29. Id. For a similar definition of theory, see Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against 
Theory, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 723, 72324 (1982). According to Fish, the theoretical project is an 
effort to govern social practices in two ways: 
(1) [I]t is an attempt to guide practice from a position above or outside it[,] and (2) it is an 
attempt to reform practice by neutralizing interest, by substituting for the parochial 
perspective of some local or partisan point of view the perspective of a general rationality to 
which the individual subordinates his contextually conditioned opinions and beliefs. 
Fish, Consequences, supra note 3, at 437 (emphasis in original). 
 30. Fish, Consequences, supra note 3, at 434. 
 31. Id. at 437. 
 32. Fish, Dennis Martinez, supra note 3, at 1797. 
 33. Id. at 1779. 
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thing: They judge.
34
 The ability or know-how for judging a case arises 
solely from participating in the interpretive community of the law or, in 
other words, from being embedded in the practice of adjudication. The 
“account one has of adjudication is logically independent of one’s ability 
to engage in it.”35 Indeed, Fish added, whether one is convinced by Fish’s 
own theoretical account of the practices of interpretation and adjudication 
is irrelevant to those practices because, after all, theory—even Fish’s 
theory—has no consequences for practice.36 The critical point of Fish’s 
argument was clear: All of the legal theory being published in law journals 
and books was inconsequential. Legal scholars write theory to govern or 
seriously influence judicial practices, but theory is irrelevant to practice. 
“The point is, finally, a simple one,” Fish explained, “there is no 
relationship between the level on which high-theory debates usually occur 
and the level on which you are asked to sort through the complexities of a 
real life situation and determine a course of action.”37 
Fish subsequently extended his argument to principle. Principles, as 
defined by Fish, are “abstractions like fairness, impartiality, mutual 
respect, and reasonableness [that supposedly] can be defined in ways not 
hostage to any partisan agenda.”38 Legal scholars articulate and invoke 
principles to argue for certain conclusions or judicial decisions; 
supposedly, the preferred conclusions or decisions issue neutrally from the 
principles rather than from some partisan political or cultural stance.
39
 The 
problem, according to Fish, is that principles cannot do any argumentative 
work—cannot support any substantive conclusion—unless bolstered by 
“some currently unexamined assumptions about the way life is or should 
be, and it is those assumptions, contestable in fact but at the moment not 
 
 
 34. Even if a judge claims to follow a theory, explaining that theory in her judicial opinions, Fish 
argued that at most the judge is offering a post-hoc account of why the case was decided as it was. The 
judge’s opinion, in other words, does not explain how the judge arrived at the decision or how the 
decision was generated. Id. at 1790. Fish’s account of judicial decision making resembled that given 
by the American legal realist, Joseph Hutcheson. Joseph C. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The 
Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929). For a discussion of 
realism, see Feldman, VOYAGE, supra note 1, at 10815. 
 35. Fish, Fiss, supra note 3, at 1347. 
 36. Id.; FISH, CLASS, supra note 3, at 370. 
 37. Fish, Minimalism, supra note 3, at 763. 
 38. FISH, PRINCIPLE, supra note 3, at 2. 
 39. For instance, Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager maintained that the religion clauses 
embody a broad principle of “equal regard,” which “demands that the interests and concerns of every 
member of the political community should be treated equally, that no person or group should be 
treated as unworthy or otherwise subordinated to an inferior status.” Christopher L. Eisgruber & 
Lawrence G. Sager, Equal Regard, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 200, 203 
(Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000). 
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contested or even acknowledged, that will really be generating the 
conclusions that are supposedly being generated by the logic of 
principle.”40 In short, the “trouble with principle is … that it does not 
exist[.]”41 But, of course, Fish added that this conclusion has no 
consequences for our actual practices. For instance, the recognition that no 
principle underlies the First Amendment does not lead to any particular 
normative interpretation of the First Amendment.
42
 So, in the end, if we 
are to make decisions and take actions—and we all apparently do so—we 
cannot turn to theory or rely on principles for guidance. We can only draw 
on our beliefs, politics, and know-how. “I am as usual offering no 
recommendation (you can’t coherently recommend an inevitability),” Fish 
admitted.
43
 “[I am] just pointing out … that when all is said and done there 
is nowhere to go except to the goals and desires that already possess you, 
and nothing to do but try as hard as you can to implement them in the 
world.”44 
B. Schlag and Normative Legal Thought 
Schlag similarly criticized legal scholarship. Most legal scholarship 
produced during the past century, according to Schlag, should be 
categorized as normative. When confronted with some specified legal or 
social problem, legal scholars typically respond by analyzing a series of 
cases, statutes, or both that seem relevant to the problem. Then the author 
concludes with a normative recommendation that will supposedly resolve 
the problem. For instance, the Supreme Court should adopt a new or 
modified doctrinal framework, or Congress should enact or amend a 
statute. To a great extent, normative law review articles read like glorified 
appellate briefs. They present the issues, discuss the facts, parse the cases, 
and recommend conclusions.
45
 For many law professors, such a normative 
recommendation is the sine qua non of “serious scholarship.”46 
 
 
 40. FISH, PRINCIPLE, supra note 3, at 3. 
 41. Id. at 2. 
 42. Id. at 11617; see Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between 
Church and State, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 383 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 
2000) (explaining how there is no principle of religious freedom). 
 43. FISH, PRINCIPLE, supra note 3, at 8. 
 44. Id. at 89. 
 45. Cf. Francis J. Mootz, Desperately Seeking Science, 17 WASH. U. L.Q. 1009, 1012 (1995) 
(observing that “[n]ormative legal scholarship often amounts to glorified advocacy briefs”). 
 46. Arthur Austin, The Postmodern Infiltration of Legal Scholarship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1504, 
1507 (2000) (reviewing PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW (1999), & JAMES BOYD 
WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE (1999)). 
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Schlag repeatedly and unmercifully condemned such normative legal 
scholarship. Normative scholars believe that their scholarly 
recommendations influence legal and political decision makers, including 
especially judges. But normative writing, Schlag declared, does not 
achieve its desired effect. For the most part, judges and other decision 
makers do not care about the recommendations of legal scholars.
47
 Most 
law review articles are published stillborn: they are never read by their 
intended audience. Schlag wrote: “Normative legal thought can no longer 
be seen to govern, regulate or even describe human activity.”48 
Although normative legal thought does not achieve its self-proclaimed 
goals, it nonetheless has harmful consequences.
49
 Normative legal thought 
constructs and reconstructs a social reality revolving around the modernist 
self—Schlag’s preferred term is the “relatively autonomous self.”50 This 
modernist self “concedes that it is socially and rhetorically constituted yet 
maintains its own autonomy to decide just how autonomous it may or may 
not be.”51 That is, the relatively autonomous self is a subject or self who 
admits that it is socially constrained, to a degree, but who nonetheless 
remains a sovereign center of power that can readily transform the 
world—merely because it chooses to do so. By suggesting to both readers 
and writers over and over again that they are free to choose and to 
implement whatever values, whatever legal and social changes, they find 
most appealing, normative legal scholarship helps induce legal scholars to 
believe that they truly have such enormous social powers—but, according 
to Schlag, they do not:
52
 
 
 
 47. Schlag, Writing, supra note 2, at 421; Schlag, The Problem, supra note 2, at 1738; Schlag, 
Normativity, supra note 2, at 87172. For years, judges and other legal scholars have been noting the 
growing gap between practitioners and law professors. Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot About Legal 
Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 295 (2000); Sanford Levinson, The Audience for Constitutional Meta-
Theory (Or, Why, and To Whom, Do I Write the Things I Do?), 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 389 (1992); 
Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). 
 48. Schlag, Nowhere, supra note 2, at 18586. 
 49. “[T]he claim is not that normative legal thought is without effect, but that the politics of 
normative legal thought are not what normative legal thought imagines them to be: its politics are in 
the process, the practice of its construction, and the form of its dissemination.” Schlag, Normativity, 
supra note 2, at 909. 
 50. See, e.g., Schlag, Fish v. Zapp, supra note 2, at 39 (referring to the “relatively autonomous 
self”). 
 51. Schlag, Normativity, supra note 2, at 895 n.248. 
 52. Id. at 84152. Schlag wrote: 
Each and every social, legal, and political event is immediately represented as an event 
calling for a value-based choice. You are free to choose between this and that. But, of course, 
you are not free. You are not free because you are constantly required to reenact the motions 
of the prescripted, already organized configuration of the individual being as chooser. You 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
278 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 9:267 
 
 
 
 
[Normative legal thought] becomes the mode of discourse by which 
bureaucratic institutions and practices re-present themselves as 
subject to the rational ethical-moral control of autonomous 
individuals (when indeed they are not), just as normative legal 
thought constructs us (you and me) to think and act as if we were at 
the center—in charge, so to speak—of our own normative legal 
thought (when indeed we are not).
53
 
Schlag aimed to reduce or even to eliminate the production of normative 
legal scholarship. Naturally, he could not simply recommend to his readers 
that they stop writing normative scholarship. Doing so would be, from 
Schlag’s perspective, ineffectual. Moreover, if Schlag had overtly 
recommended such a change, he too would have been guilty of 
reconstructing the modernist self. He would have been encouraging his 
readers to assume they could change the world merely by declaring their 
value choices and implementing them. So instead, Schlag wrote 
deconstructively: He sought to uncover and disrupt the illegitimate 
assumptions that tacitly undergird normative legal scholarship—
assumptions that ordinarily go unrecognized and unexamined.
54
 Schlag, 
like other postmodern deconstructionists, brought background assumptions 
to the forefront so that they could be scrutinized and critiqued. He was 
most concerned, of course, with the assumption that we are modernist 
selves who can readily transform the world. Hence, Schlag wanted his 
deconstructive attack to induce readers to doubt their being or existence as 
such selves.
55
 If they were to do so, Schlag believed, then they would 
 
 
have to, you already are constructed and channeled as a choosing being. Not only is this 
social construction of the self extraordinarily oppressive—but it often turns out to be absurd 
as well. Much of its absurdity can be seen in the normative visions that routinely issue from 
the legal academy urging us to adopt this utopian program or that one—as if somehow our 
choices (I like decentralized socialism, you like conservative pastoral politics, she likes liberal 
cultural pluralism) had any direct, self-identical effect on the construction of our social or 
political scene. The critical insistence on making political value choices is utterly captive to a 
conventional and nostalgic description of the political field—a description and definition of 
the field that is guaranteed to yield political disablement and disempowerment. To tell people 
that they are already empowered to make political value choices is, in effect, to bolster the 
dominant culture’s representation that we are free-choosing beings and to strengthen the 
forces that lead to our own repeated, compelled affirmation of (meaningless) choices. 
Schlag, The Problem, supra note 2, at 170001 (footnotes omitted). 
 53. Schlag, Nowhere, supra note 2, at 185 (emphasis in original). 
 54. See, e.g., Schlag, Phrenology, supra note 2 (seeking to deconstruct normative legal 
scholarship, particularly Langdellian scholarship, by comparing it to the now-disreputable science of 
phrenology). For a critique of Schlag’s Phrenology article, see Stephen M. Feldman, Playing With the 
Pieces: Postmodernism in the Lawyer’s Toolbox, 85 VA. L. REV. 151, 16476 (1999). 
 55. Schlag explained that most American legal thinkers have focused on “either law’s relation to 
its own internal requirements (formalism) or law’s relation to its object (legal realism).” SCHLAG, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol9/iss2/7
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likely stop writing normative legal scholarship—because they would 
recognize that it is irrelevant to legal and judicial practices. 
II. FISH AND SCHLAG ATTACK EACH OTHER: THE PERSISTENT 
MODERNIST SELF 
Schlag’s criticism of Fish was straightforward: A little Harold with a 
purple crayon—a modernist self—lurks within Fish’s central concept of an 
interpretive community.
56
 According to Schlag, Fish left ambiguous the 
meaning or content of interpretive communities. Interpretive communities, 
as described by Fish, perform a function similar to that of Thomas Kuhn’s 
paradigms or Hans-Georg Gadamer’s traditions.57 That is, interpretive 
communities, like paradigms or traditions, provide us with the background 
that is needed for interpretation and understanding to get off the ground. 
Yet, Fish did not attempt to closely specify the precise definition of an 
interpretive community. As Schlag phrased it, Fish’s interpretive 
communities are “theoretical unmentionables” that are left “relatively 
empty and unstructured.”58 
Schlag argued that Fish’s failure to define concretely the contours of 
interpretive communities was not mere happenstance. If Fish had 
specifically defined interpretive communities, then the process of 
interpretation might have appeared too mechanistic, and humans might 
have seemed doomed to some form of determinism—where external and 
objective forces predetermine or dictate human actions, perceptions, and 
even thoughts. In other words, Schlag argued that Fish ambiguously 
rendered the concept of an interpretive community to avoid a Fishian form 
of a determined self.
59
 Schlag pounced, declaring that Fish’s nebulous 
notion of an interpretive community “leaves the self as the final 
adjudicator of its own acts….”60 Fish, in short, had smuggled the 
modernist self into his interpretive schema. For Schlag, this was a fatal 
mistake. Fish’s notion of the self, as construed by Schlag, always retains 
 
 
LAYING, supra note 2, at 163. He instead sought to focus on a “third relation…one between law and 
the subjects who invoke its name.” Id. 
 56. Schlag criticized Fish in Schlag, Fish v. Zapp, supra note 2. 
 57. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 28284 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. 
Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 1989); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
4351 (2d ed. 1970). 
 58. Schlag, Fish v. Zapp, supra note 2, at 42. 
 59. Id. at 4445. 
 60. Id. at 45. 
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autonomy because it does “not feel closeted by an overly determined 
objectivity.”61 
Schlag argued further that Fish’s imprecision leaves a lacuna within the 
process of interpretation. Because interpretive communities are not closely 
defined, the elements of the process of interpretation also cannot be 
specifically delineated. Ultimately and inevitably, then, the modernist self 
provides the necessary substance and direction: 
The self knows that there is something irreducible about the act of 
interpretation that simply cannot be made articulate and that in any 
case could not be captured by anything so systematic, so universal, 
or so univocal as a theory. The self knows that interpretation is a 
social practice and that there will always be something about 
practice that cannot be reduced to rules, theory, or reason.
62
 
According to Schlag, when interpretation cannot be reduced to a method 
or mechanical process, when practices cannot be governed by theories, 
when adjudication cannot be determined by principles, we find the 
relatively autonomous self pulling the levers and hitting the buttons.
63
 Of 
course, Fish nonetheless was booming, “Pay no attention to the self behind 
the curtain!”64 
Turning the tables, Fish similarly criticized Schlag. Schlag’s goal, 
recall, was to reduce or eliminate the production of normative legal 
scholarship. To do so, he deconstructed such scholarship by uncovering its 
ostensibly illegitimate assumption or foundation: the modernist self. 
According to Fish, though, Schlag mistakenly believed that his 
deconstructive attack on legal scholarship could actually change the world. 
As Fish read Schlag, Schlag wanted legal scholars to become more “‘self-
conscious or self-critical.’”65 If legal scholars were to acquire “the 
requisite critical self-consciousness,”66 then they (we) presumably would 
refrain from writing normative articles. After all, if legal scholars realized 
 
 
 61. Id. Adam Thurschwell provided an interesting alternative perspective. He argued that while 
the concepts such as Gadamer’s tradition or Fish’s interpretive community help us to grasp or 
understand the social construction of reality—our being-in-the-world—we should not attempt to reify 
or reduce any actual tradition or interpretive community (or even the concepts themselves) into a 
single linguistic formulation or a fixed object. Adam Thurschwell, Reading the Law, in THE RHETORIC 
OF LAW 275, 31217 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1994). 
 62. Schlag, Fish v. Zapp, supra note 2, at 44. 
 63. Id. at 3940. 
 64. In the movie, The Wizard of Oz, the Wizard, when he is discovered, says, “Pay no attention 
to that man behind the curtain.” THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. 1939). 
 65. Fish, Minimalism, supra note 3, at 769 (quoting Schlag, Normativity, supra note 2, at 852). 
 66. Fish, Minimalism, supra note 3, at 770. 
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that they and their readers were not modernist selves, then why would they 
continue writing a form of scholarship that assumed otherwise? In sum, 
Schlag wanted to disturb his readers sufficiently so that they became more 
self-reflexive, thereby doubting their existence as modernist selves, and 
ultimately ceasing to write normative legal scholarship. 
Fish argued, though, that Schlag’s deconstructive writings were merely 
a form of theory. Even if Schlag was more imaginative or obscure than 
most theorists, his theory-writing was, in the end, no more effective than 
any other theory. Fish explained, 
Rhetorical/deconstructive legal thought produces nothing, for, like 
normative legal thought, it is not a practice, but an account of a 
practice. Just as normative legal thought cannot confer on the 
practices of which it is an account, the qualities it prizes (stability, 
neutrality, and so on), neither can rhetorical/deconstructive legal 
thought confer on the practice of which it is an account the qualities 
it prizes (indeterminacy, dispersal, de-centeredness, and so on).
67
 
So, according to Fish, deconstructive legal thought cannot disturb or 
change the practice of legal scholarship. The form and quantity of 
normative legal scholarship will go unchanged. In fact, Fish added, 
normative legal thought could not possibly become more self-aware of its 
own rhetoricity—which Schlag quested after—because then “it would no 
longer be normative legal thought[.]”68 Instead, “it would be some form of 
thought—sociological or anthropological in nature—that took normative 
legal thought as its object[.]”69 
Fish, in effect, criticized Schlag for assuming that his readers could be 
liberated once they recognized that normative legal scholarship is 
grounded on unrealistic assumptions. Put in other words, Fish castigated 
Schlag for assuming that his readers were modernist selves empowered to 
change their world, if only they would listen to Schlag.
70
 Schlag wrote as if 
his readers were little Harolds, waiting with their purple crayons, anxious 
to redraw the world of legal scholarship. Even though Schlag did not 
overtly recommend social and legal changes, as normative legal scholars 
do, Schlag nonetheless counted on a clandestine modernist self to be a 
 
 
 67. Id. at 771 (emphasis in original). 
 68. Id. at 769. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Stephen M. Feldman, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship and 
Judicial Practice (With an Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New Rules in Habeas Corpus Cases), 
88 NW. U. L. REV. 1046, 1097 (1994) (criticizing Schlag for writing about trial lawyers as if they were 
relatively autonomous selves). 
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center of power and control. Thus, Fish concluded, however right Schlag 
might be in his depiction of social reality and legal scholarship, his 
argument “goes nowhere, issues in nothing, is of no consequence 
whatsoever.”71 Schlag addressed a reader who does not exist. 
Deconstructive legal thought, theory, and scholarship—like all legal 
thought, theory, and scholarship—is totally distinct from the practices they 
describe and seek to influence.
72
 
III. FEMINIST THEORY AND THE RELATIONAL (POSTMODERN) SELF 
A. The Problem of the Socially Constructed Self 
Fish and Schlag criticized each other for making the same mistake. 
That mistake could be traced directly to a central and common postmodern 
theme. Namely, both Fish and Schlag uncovered and elaborated the social 
construction of the subject or self. In contrast with modernist depictions of 
the self as an independent and autonomous agent exercising sovereign 
control, postmodernists emphasize that social forces and relations 
constitute the self (or the experience of a self).
73
 For instance, Michel 
Foucault described how power permeates society and produces disciplined 
and normalized selves (and bodies).
74
 Power constructs us as “subjects.”75 
Jacques Derrida emphasized the connection between language and the 
constitution of the self. The self or subject is not “what it says it is. The 
subject is not some meta-linguistic substance or identity, some pure cogito 
of self-presence; it is always inscribed in language.”76 
Fish and Schlag both subscribed to this view of the subject or self. Fish 
emphasized that the individual self is always and already situated in an 
 
 
 71. Fish, Minimalism, supra note 3, at 772. 
 72. “Theorists like Schlag may be right when they describe the law and everything in it as 
‘socially constructed,’ but the rightness of the description does no work. It does not lead to an 
alteration in practice.” Id. at 771. 
 73. HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND 
HERMENEUTICS 120 (2d ed. 1983); David Couzens Hoy, Introduction, in FOUCAULT: A CRITICAL 
READER 1, 4-5 (David Couzens Hoy ed., 1986). 
 74. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE, supra note 6, at 3031, 18283, 193; Michel Foucault, Why Study 
Power: The Question of the Subject, reprinted in HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL 
FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 208, 208, 212 (2d ed. 1983). 
 75. Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE 78, 97 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin 
Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham & Kate Soper trans., 1980); see Marcelo Hoffman, Disciplinary 
Power, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS 27, 3334 (Dianna Taylor ed., 2011) (explaining 
Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power). 
 76. Jacques Derrida, Deconstruction and the Other, in DIALOGUES WITH CONTEMPORARY 
CONTINENTAL THINKERS 107, 125 (Richard Kearney ed., 1984) (emphasis in original). 
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interpretive community. There is no ‘escape from’ or ‘prior to’ this 
situated existence.
77
 Meanwhile, Schlag stressed that culture constitutes 
the individual’s perceptions of herself. The culture of the legal 
community, including legal scholarship, constructs and reconstructs our 
perceptions that we—scholars and readers—are modernist (relatively 
autonomous) selves who can exercise control over the social and legal 
world.
78
 The problem for Fish and Schlag was that if one is underscoring 
the social construction of the subject, then harboring a modernist self 
within one’s scholarship might be a tad embarrassing. Hence, Schlag 
attacked Fish on this point, and vice versa. Although each explored the 
ramifications of the social construction of the subject, they both retained 
some remnant of the self in their writings. 
Regardless, important lessons can be gleaned from this confrontation 
between Fish and Schlag. If renowned postmodernists like Fish and Schlag 
both sheltered selves in their writings, then who can avoid doing so? 
Nobody, as Derrida himself suggested. Derrida steadfastly deconstructed 
the modernist self (specifically, in his terms, Derrida focused on the so-
called “metaphysics of presence”),79 but he admitted that his very 
arguments unavoidably reinscribe or recreate the self. “There is no sense 
in doing without the concepts of metaphysics [including the modernist 
self] in order to shake metaphysics[,]” Derrida wrote.80 “We have no 
language—no syntax and no lexicon—which is foreign to this history; we 
can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already 
had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of 
precisely what it seeks to contest.”81 In other words, we are all little 
Harolds dragging around our purple crayons. To be sure, I certainly have 
not avoided this trap (of) myself. 
Three interrelated implications flow from this realization. First, when 
Fish and Schlag criticized others for acting like little Harolds, they were 
shooting at easy targets: Of course, legal scholars could be unmasked as 
modernist selves. I do not mean to suggest that Fish’s and Schlag’s 
critiques of legal scholarship were, at the time, obvious or not worthwhile. 
For several years, Fish and Schlag were among our most imaginative and 
interesting jurisprudential scholars. After all, before Fish and Schlag, 
 
 
 77. Fish, Change, supra note 3, at 42324, 433. 
 78. Schlag, Normativity, supra note 2, at 84152. 
 79. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 50 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1976). 
 80. Jacques Derrida, Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, in 
WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 278, 280 (Alan Bass trans., 1978). 
 81. Id. at 28081. 
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nobody would have written in a law review: ‘Of course, legal scholars 
could be unmasked as modernist selves.’ 
Second, to a great degree, Fish and Schlag wasted their time attacking 
each other, but perhaps they did not know what else to do. They had both 
thoroughly denounced traditional legal scholarship, so it would have been 
hypocritical for either one to write normative articles advocating for a 
theory or principle. What to do next?
82
 Well, let’s attack another 
postmodernist. But their respective attacks accomplished little beyond 
allowing each scholar to add a publication to his CV. Nobody in the legal 
academy should have been less surprised than Fish and Schlag to learn 
that each one harbored a Harold in his scholarship. 
Third, Fish and Schlag’s confrontation, arising from their invocations 
of the socially constructed subject and their attacks on the modernist self, 
sheds light on the current moribund state of postmodern jurisprudence. In 
the American legal system, a dismissal of the self is unlikely to be well-
received.
83
 Given our Constitution, with its emphasis on individual rights 
such as free expression and religious freedom, scholarship denigrating the 
self, autonomy, and agency will probably fall on deaf ears. To a great 
degree, David Gray Carlson accurately assessed the reception to Schlag’s 
criticisms of legal scholarship and the modernist self: “The legal academy 
refuses [even] to duel with Pierre Schlag.”84 When Schlag grandiosely 
declared that his scholarship threatened the academy with catastrophe, 
nobody shook in their boots.
85
 Instead, Schlag sounded unfortunately 
shrill. The legal scholars who paid the most attention to Schlag’s writings 
were other postmodernists, like Fish, and we know his reaction. 
Perhaps, given this disconnect between postmodern and mainstream 
legal scholarship, it is unsurprising that postmodernism is rarely discussed 
in contemporary law reviews, especially flagship reviews.
86
 The 1990s 
 
 
 82. Schlag would eventually arrive at one answer to this question. He would solemnly declare 
that legal scholarship is “dead.” Schlag, Spam, supra note 2, at 804. 
 83. Nedelsky, supra note 13, at 42 (emphasizing the “iconic value” of autonomy in American 
culture); SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN 15 (1995) (arguing that everyday life encourages us to 
view ourselves as autonomous intentional agents). 
 84. David Gray Carlson, Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1908, 1953 (1999) (reviewing PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998) & PIERRE 
SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND 
(1996)). 
 85. At various times, Schlag pronounced that his writings were “threatening,” Schlag, Missing 
Pieces, supra note 2, at 1243; made the reader “feel assaulted,” Schlag, Normativity, supra note 2, at 
893; and engendered “intellectual and cultural catastrophe.” Schlag, Nowhere, supra note 2, at 190. 
 86. By a flagship review, I mean a law school’s general student-edited review, as opposed to 
secondary journals. For example, the William & Mary Law Review is a flagship journal, while the 
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal is a secondary journal. 
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were the halcyon days for publishing articles about postmodernism. For 
instance, a Westlaw search for postmodernism and its derivatives and 
synonyms (such as postmodern, postmodernity, postmodernist, post-
modern, pomo, post-structuralism, and so on) in the ‘Law Reviews & 
Journals’ database revealed that from 1982 to 1986, flagship journals 
published only three articles referring to postmodernism in the title. From 
1987 to 1991, the number jumped to eighteen. Then the number 
skyrocketed: thirty-five from 1992 to 1996, and thirty-nine from 1997 to 
2001.
87
 After 2001, the numbers declined, at first gradually, then 
precipitously. From 2002 to 2006, twenty-six articles were published, but 
from 2007 to 2011, the number dropped to eleven. From 2012 to the 
present, flagship journals published only two such articles. Predictably, 
then, recent publications have commented on the passing or death of 
postmodernism.
88
 One might reasonably conclude that postmodern 
jurisprudence stalled during the naughts and never restarted. 
B. Feminist Theory 
Many modernist critics insist that the postmodern notion of the socially 
constructed self inevitably leads to determinism (entailing, among other 
things, a self bereft of free will). These critics argue that either the self 
retains some inherent degree of independence and sovereign control or the 
self disappears into a conglomeration of causal factors. A socially 
constructed subject or self loses all vestige of autonomy.
89
 To clarify this 
critique, it helps to recognize that postmodernists divide into two groups: 
extreme and moderate.
90
 Extreme postmodernists, on the one hand, are 
 
 
 87. During these times, there were nearly as many articles published in secondary journals. 
Additional articles were published with the word, deconstruction, and its derivatives in the title. For 
example, from 1992 to 1996, thirty-six articles were published in secondary journals, and sixteen 
articles were published with the word deconstruction in the title. 
 88. JOSH TOTH, THE PASSING OF POSTMODERNISM: A SPECTROANALYSIS OF THE 
CONTEMPORARY (2010); Adam G. Todd, Neither Dead nor Dangerous: Postmodernism and the 
Teaching of Legal Writing, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 893, 894 (2006); Timotheus Vermeulen & Robin van 
den Akker, Notes on Metamodernism, 2 J. OF AESTHETICS & CULTURE (2010) 
http://www.aestheticsandculture.net/index.php/jac/article/view/5677; see Stephen M. Feldman, An 
Arrow to the Heart: The Love and Death of Postmodern Legal Scholarship, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2351 
(2001) (defending postmodernism). 
 89. See Dianna Taylor, Introduction: Power, Freedom and Subjectivity, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: 
KEY CONCEPTS 1, 2 (Dianna Taylor ed., 2011) (describing this criticism of Foucault). 
 90. See STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER, POSTMODERN THEORY 25657 (1991) 
(distinguishing extreme from reconstructive postmodernism); Stephen M. Feldman, The Problem of 
Critique: Triangulating Habermas, Derrida, and Gadamer Within Metamodernism, 4 CONTEMP. POL. 
THEORY 296, 299304 (2005) [hereinafter Feldman, The Problem] (distinguishing antimodernism 
from metamodernism). 
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anti-modernists: They reject modernist concepts such as truth, knowledge, 
and freedom. Moderate postmodernists, on the other hand, tend to 
repudiate modernist notions of these concepts, but often reformulate the 
concepts in accord with postmodern themes.
91
 For example, a moderate 
postmodernist might invoke the notion of knowledge but refuse to 
characterize it as being objective—that is, grounded on the brute data of an 
external objective world.
92
 Nonetheless the modernist critique, that the 
postmodern notion of the socially constructed self inevitably leads to 
determinism, might be valid for extreme postmodernists. Such 
postmodernists argue that “there is ‘really’ no subject, no consciousness, 
no freedom, just an ‘interplay of forces’ and our ‘selves’ nothing but the 
tentative juncture of these forces.”93 
Because extreme postmodernism and the social construction of the self 
appear to end in determinism, many feminists initially rejected 
postmodernism.
94
 Feminism aims for social transformation to relieve 
women from oppression and subjugation.
95
 Such political change, it would 
seem, requires individual agency and autonomy, as well as the possibility 
of social critique. If women lack the autonomy necessary to criticize and 
change current social and cultural structures, then women would appear 
locked into patriarchy.
96
 
 
 
 91. See Richard J. Bernstein, Foucault: Critique as a Philosophic Ethos, in THE NEW 
CONSTELLATION 142, 154-55 (1991) (arguing Foucault does not herald the death of the subject, truth, 
or freedom). 
 92. See Best & Kellner, supra note 6, at 258 (arguing for a postmodern reconstruction of 
epistemological concepts); Kuhn, supra note 57,  at 15, 24, 12526, 135 (arguing paradigms shape fact 
observations, and questioning the accessibility of brute data in science); Feldman, The Problem, supra 
note 90, at 30103 (arguing for truth and understanding without objectivity). 
 93. ROBERT C. SOLOMON & KATHLEEN M. HIGGINS, A SHORT HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 303 
(1996); see DOUGLAS KELLNER, MEDIA CULTURE 233 (2003) (summarizing the postmodern attack on 
the modernist self). “In the extreme version of postmodernism, the determinants of class and race and 
age and group and religion and sexual orientation and role and mood and context constitute us in a 
changing pattern from moment to moment. From their varied intersection springs up a postmodern 
self. ‘I’ am merely the place where these things happen.” James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible? The 
Post-Modern Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 489, 521 (1991). 
 94. Martha Minow, Incomplete Correspondence: An Unsent Letter to Mary Joe Frug, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 1096, 1104 (1992) (questioning the political implications of postmodernism); see Christine Di 
Stefano, Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity, and Postmodernism, in 
FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 63 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990) (questioning connections between 
feminism and postmodernism). 
 95. See, e.g., Tracy E. Higgins, Why Feminists Can’t (or Shouldn’t) Be Liberals, 72 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1629, 1629 (2004) (discussing connections between liberalism and women’s subordination); 
Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, Introduction: Autonomy Refigured, in RELATIONAL 
AUTONOMY 3, 34 (2000) (discussing the need to understand oppression and subjection); Cynthia 
Willett et al., Feminist Perspectives on the Self, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., fall 2015 ed.) (emphasizing subordination of women’s selfhood). 
 96. See, e.g., ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, FEMINISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS 15359, 22021 
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Yet other feminists recognized close affinities between postmodernism 
and feminist theory.
97
 Most important, feminists discerned that the 
modernist conception of the self was unrealistic, that the autonomous and 
sovereign agent, independent of and unconstrained by social relationships, 
disregarded women’s experiences. Groundbreaking work in psychology 
set the stage for this breakthrough. Nancy Chodorow argued that 
individuals develop a sense of self only in relation to others. More 
specifically, young girls and boys connect with and react to their primary 
caregivers, usually mothers.
98
 Carol Gilligan extended this insight by 
showing that girls develop a different voice from boys, a different sense of 
morality—an ethic of care—because of their existential connection to 
others.
99
 Feminist political, social, and jurisprudential theorists built on 
this basic insight, that the self is relational rather than atomistic, that 
“human beings are created in and through relations with other human 
beings.”100 
 
 
(1991) (rejecting postmodernism as threat to feminism); Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social 
Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59 (1989) (arguing that women have a self contrary to 
postmodern arguments). 
 97. Martha Chamallas, Past as Prologue:  Old and New Feminisms, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 
157, 16970 (2010) (recognizing the emergence of an explicitly postmodern feminism); see, e.g., 
Nancy Fraser & Linda J. Nicholson, Social Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encounter Between 
Feminism and Postmodernism, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 19 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990) 
(attempting to integrate feminism and postmodernism). The most renowned postmodern feminist is 
Judith Butler. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990). Like other postmodernists, feminist 
postmodernists do not necessarily announce that they are postmodern. Regardless, I would include, 
among others, the following: Amy Allen, Julie E. Cohen, Drucilla Cornell, Tracy E. Higgins, Margaret 
A. McLaren, and Dianna Taylor. AMY ALLEN, THE POLITICS OF OUR SELVES (2008); JULIE E. COHEN, 
CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF  (2012); DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION 
(New ed. 1999); Tracy E. Higgins, “By Reason of Their Sex”: Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and 
Justice, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1536 (1995); Margaret A. McLaren, Foucault and Feminism: Power, 
Resistance, Freedom, in FEMINISM AND THE FINAL FOUCAULT 214 (Dianna Taylor & Karen Vintges 
eds., 2004); Dianna Taylor, Practices of the Self, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS 173 (Dianna 
Taylor ed., 2011). 
 98. NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978); see Marilyn Friedman, 
Autonomy and Social Relationships: Rethinking the Feminist Critique, in FEMINISTS RETHINK THE 
SELF 40, 43 (Diana Tietjens Meyers ed., 1997) [hereinafter Friedman, Relationships] (summarizing 
Chodorow’s argument). 
 99. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); see NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A 
RELATIONAL APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION (2d ed. 2013) (advocating for ethic of 
care from philosophical standpoint). 
 100. Jane Flax, Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic 
Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics, in, DISCOVERING REALITY 245, 250 (Sandra Harding 
& Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983); see, e.g., Susan J. Brison, Outliving Oneself: Trauma, Memory, and 
Personal Identity, in FEMINISTS RETHINK THE SELF 12 (Diana Tietjens Meyers ed., 1997) (arguing for 
a relational self); Friedman, Relationships, supra note 98, at 4047 (building concept of autonomy on 
relational self); Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987) 
(building on different voice theory), Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1988) (same). Communitarians also criticized the modernist individual or self. ALASDAIR 
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An overlap with postmodernism crystallized. Postmodernists like 
Foucault asserted that power constructs us as subjects or selves, while 
feminists argued that we develop and are sustained through relationships. 
Regardless of the precise terminology, the positions resonated: The self is 
a social creature.
101
 The socially constructed self is a relational self, and 
vice versa.
102
  While Chodorow had focused on mothering as caregiving, 
other feminist theorists extended their analyses to additional social 
relationships. In Jennifer Nedelsky’s words, our relational selves “are 
constituted, yet not determined, by the web of nested relations within 
which we live.”103 She elaborated, 
[E]ach individual is in basic ways constituted by networks of 
relationships of which they are a part—networks that range from 
intimate relations with parents, friends, or lovers to relations 
between student and teacher, welfare recipient and caseworker, 
citizen and state, to being participants in a global economy, 
migrants in a world of gross economic inequality, inhabitants of a 
world shaped by global warming.
104
 
Other feminists, who were not only women but also racial minorities or 
members of other peripheral groups, pushed this insight about the 
multiplicity of nested relations while giving it a different twist. They 
emphasized that our selves develop at the intersection of multiple cultural 
and social forces.
105
 Selves or “identities are formed within the context of 
social relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting social 
 
 
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (3d ed. 2007); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF 
JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998). 
 101. Friedman, Relationships, supra note 98, at 42 (emphasizing social nature of self); see Amy 
Allen, Foucault, Feminism, and the Self: The Politics of Personal Transformation, in FEMINISM AND 
THE FINAL FOUCAULT 235 (Dianna Taylor & Karen Vintges eds., 2004) [hereinafter Allen, 
Transformation] (discussing the connection between Foucault and the feminist relational self); 
McLaren, supra note 97, at 21519 (linking feminism with Foucauldian postmodernism). As McLaren 
points out, Foucault also viewed power as being relational. McLaren, supra note 97, at 219. 
 102. Nancy J. Hirschmann, Autonomy? Or Freedom? A Return to Psycholanalytic Theory, in 
AUTONOMY, OPPRESSION, AND GENDER 61, 73 (Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper eds., 2014) (“our 
desires and preferences are socially constructed”). 
 103. Nedelsky, supra note 13, at 45 (emphasis added). 
 104. Id. at 19. 
 105. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in 
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); see John A. Powell, The Multiple Self: 
Exploring Between and Beyond Modernity and Postmodernity, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1481 (1997) 
(discussing an intersectional self). 
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determinants, such as race, class, gender, and ethnicity.”106 Feminists thus 
were acutely aware that not all relationships are equivalent. Some are more 
empowering, some are more oppressive, and perhaps all are partly both.
107
 
As Nancy J. Hirschmann explained, “because [social and relational] 
contexts are importantly shaped by patriarchy, sexism, racism, classism, 
and heterosexism, social construction is not simply innocent or 
neutral[.]”108 Furthermore, social conditions and relations can impose 
constraints on individuals at the unconscious level. The constraints are, in 
a sense, absorbed as part of one’s personality.109 Judith Butler emphasized 
how power operates at a deep psychic level by shaping our fantasies and 
desires.
110
 For example, a woman might embody notions of femininity 
even if they are debilitating.
111
 
The ambivalence of the social construction of the self—the potential 
space between the empowering and oppressive effects of social relations—
led feminists to emphasize the concept of autonomy. As feminists 
perceived, the modernist critique of the postmodern social construction of 
the self—that it necessarily leads to determinism—arises from the 
modernist world view itself. Modernism revolves around subject-object 
metaphysics, around the sharp separation of the free and independent self 
from the objective world.
112
 From this modernist perspective, if the 
individual is not free in the modernist sense, then the individual is 
necessarily determined. Autonomy, from the modernist perspective, 
requires an independent and atomistic self. But we do not have to accept 
this modernist paradigm with its dichotomy of free will versus 
 
 
 106. Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 95, at 4; see Hirschmann, supra note 102, at 73 
(emphasizing the intersection of “gender, sexuality, race, and class”). 
 107. Friedman, Relationships, supra note 98, at 5556. Butler begins The Psychic Life of Power 
by pointing out that even “subjection is paradoxical.” JUDITH BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER: 
THEORIES IN SUBJECTION 1 (1997). 
 108. Hirschmann, supra note 102, at 73. 
 109. Id. (“cultural norms and social practices can produce desires within women that arbitrarily 
limit their abilities to engage in the world”); see CATRIONA MACKENZIE, Three Dimensions of 
Autonomy: A Relational Analysis, in AUTONOMY, OPPRESSION, AND GENDER 15, 2223 (Andrea 
Veltman & Mark Piper eds., 2014) (arguing that certain social conditions unjustly limit self-
determination). 
 110. BUTLER, supra note 107, at 9, 78; see Allen, supra note 97, at 7295, 17374, 183 
(explaining, criticizing, and extending Butler’s argument). 
 111. Compare Natalie Stoljar, Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY 
94, 95 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000) (claiming “that preferences influenced by 
oppressive norms of femininity cannot be autonomous”), with Friedman, supra note 13, at 2425 
(arguing that women living within conditions of oppression can still exercise some degree of 
autonomy). 
 112. See RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, 
HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983). 
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determinism.
113
 To the contrary, the concept of the relational self 
prompted numerous feminists to reconceive autonomy from a relational 
perspective. Once feminists repudiated the modernist self, they did not 
need to follow the modernist argument from social construction to a 
logical end in determinism. Having escaped the trap of modern subject-
object metaphysics, feminists maintained that autonomy should not be 
equated with self-sufficiency and independence.
114
 
From the feminist perspective, autonomy develops only in and through 
relationships.
115
 What does this mean? The creation or construction of the 
relational self is an ongoing process.
116
 An individual does not reach the 
age of three or five or whatever and suddenly become static, frozen in 
development. Instead, one’s self is always and already emerging. In other 
words, the relational self is an emergent self, and the process of emergence 
is always relational.
117
 According to Nedelsky, “Human beings are in a 
constant process of becoming, in interaction with the many layers of 
relationship in which they are embedded.”118 The crux of autonomy, then, 
is a capacity to participate in this ongoing process of self-creation.
119
 
This autonomy is itself relational. Our relationships can facilitate the 
development of a capacity for self-creation and self-determination.
120
 Most 
obviously, the parent-child relationship can foster in the child a capacity 
for autonomous reflection and action.
121
 Autonomy, then, is not only 
harmonious with but also arises from “human connections, including those 
manifested in love, friendship, appropriate care, and even loyalty and 
devotion.”122 Nedelsky extended this point to underscore that autonomy is 
 
 
 113. Butler argues against allowing “feminist discourse on cultural construction [to remain] 
trapped within the unnecessary binarism of free will and determinism. Construction is not opposed to 
agency; it is the necessary scene of agency, the very terms in which agency is articulated and becomes 
culturally intelligible.” Butler, supra note 97, at 187; see BAUMAN & RAUD, supra note 9, at 102 
(rejecting opposition between “determination and self-creation”). 
 114. Friedman, Relationships, supra note 98, at 41. 
 115. Some mainstream philosophers have also articulated a relational autonomy. E.g., GERALD 
DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988); see Friedman, supra note 13, at 8791 
(discussing mainstream philosophers). 
 116. BAUMAN & RAUD, supra note 9, at 13233; Nedelsky, supra note 13, at 50; Edward 
McGushin, Foucault’s Theory and Practice of Subjectivity, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS 
127, 141 (Dianna Taylor ed., 2011). The “subject is never fully constituted.” Judith Butler, Contingent 
Foundations, in FEMINIST CONTENTIONS 35, 47 (1995). 
 117. KENNETH J. GERGEN, RELATIONAL BEING xv (2009). 
 118. Nedelsky, supra note 13, at 38. 
 119. Id. at 45. 
 120. Friedman, supra note 13, at 47, 1921. 
 121. Nedelsky, supra note 13, at 19. 
 122. Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper, Introduction to AUTONOMY, OPPRESSION, AND GENDER 1, 4 
(Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper eds., 2014). 
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relational through-and-through. “As we act (usually partially) 
autonomously, we are always in interaction with the relationships 
(intimate and social–structural) that enable our autonomy. Relations are 
then constitutive of autonomy rather than conditions for it.”123 An 
individual can exercise autonomy in isolation no more than she can 
communicate without a linguistic community of other individuals.
124
 
The social construction of the relational self is always both limiting and 
enabling.
125
 For example, a nurturing parental relationship is primarily 
enabling, while a racist or sexist relationship is primarily limiting. The 
relational self can distinguish between the limiting and enabling effects of 
social forces to the degree it is autonomous. To be clear, we never 
completely escape social forces, the power of relationships.
126
 Yet, we can 
learn to create ourselves, to resist unwanted relations, to fight 
oppression—but only because of the tools we acquire and sustain in our 
social context, in our relationships.
127
 We can navigate power the way a 
surfer rides a wave. Irresistible power can overwhelm us at any moment, 
but with the proper training, we retain the possibility of affecting our 
course in a meaningful fashion.
128
 This metaphor breaks down, though, if 
we imagine a sole surfer. We are never surfing alone because autonomy is 
a relational capacity or competency, “a mode of interacting with 
others.”129 As Marilyn Friedman summarized relational autonomy, 
“persons are fundamentally social beings who develop the competency for 
autonomy through social interaction with other persons. These 
developments take place in a context of values, meanings, and modes of 
self-reflection that cannot exist except as constituted by social 
practices.”130 
What about Harold and his purple crayon? We now know that Harold 
had a far richer life than initial appearances suggested. For his age, Harold 
is an outstanding artist, but he has been lucky. His mother and father are 
 
 
 123. Nedelsky, supra note 13, at 46. 
 124. See id. at 55 (comparing autonomy to speaking a language). “[A]gency is not an attribute of a 
subject or something that someone has, but is rather a relationship that is enacted in the world.”  Maria 
Pallotta-Chiarolli & Bob Pease, Recognition, Resistance and Reconstruction, in THE POLITICS OF 
RECOGNITION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 1, 5 (Maria Pallotta-Chiarolli & Bob Pease eds. 2014). 
 125. Cushman, supra note 10, at 350; Linda Barclay, Autonomy and the Social Self, in 
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY 52, 56-57 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000). 
 126. Allen, supra note 97, at 179. 
 127. McLaren, supra note 97, at 21518. 
 128. Taylor, supra note 89 at 4 (discussing Foucault and “the practice of navigating power”). 
 129. Nedelsky, supra note 13, at 55. 
 130. Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, Social Disruption, and Women, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY 
35, 40 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000). 
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wealthy enough to buy him a purple crayon. Moreover, his mother is a 
graphic designer who draws with Harold every day. His father praises 
Harold’s drawings and tapes them on the refrigerator. The family lives in a 
small but vibrant city in the United States. That city has an excellent pre-
school, which Harold attends. Harold also enjoys kicking a ball around the 
backyard with his friend, Frances. Harold wants to play on a soccer team 
with Frances, but Harold’s parents believe that organized sports are overly 
competitive. They refuse to sign him up for the neighborhood mini-soccer 
league. Over time, Harold begins to think of himself as an artist. He joins 
the Art Club in high school. He frequently marvels at the beauty of the 
world and envisions pictures that he could paint. Later in life, Frances 
plays college soccer, while Harold becomes a professional artist. 
Harold, quite clearly, developed as an individual, as a self, within a 
web of relationships, including his mother, his father, his friend, his 
school, his city, and so on. Those relationships simultaneously enabled and 
constrained Harold. He developed a capacity for artistic expression, for 
autonomous self-creation, and he eventually became a successful artist, 
but he never played soccer. As an artist, Harold experienced a high degree 
of satisfaction. He had internalized an identity as an artist, so he was 
happy to make money doing what he loved. Yet, like many people he 
knew, Harold had mixed feelings about his parents. He frequently wished 
they had encouraged him to play team sports. 
IV. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE 
The recognition of a relational self and relational autonomy has at least 
two significant implications. First, social critique is possible. If we have 
the capacity to distinguish limiting from enabling social forces and 
relations, then we also have the capacity to criticize our society and 
culture. Although there is no escape from relationships of power, that 
means only “that there is no Archimedean point, no point wholly outside 
power relations from which our critique of power can be launched or our 
transformative vision of a better future can be articulated.”131 But if one 
repudiates modernist subject-object metaphysics, then the lack of an 
Archimedean point should be neither surprising nor problematic.
132
 As 
feminist philosopher Amy Allen emphasized, “we can envision subjects as 
 
 
 131. Allen, supra note 97, at 177; see Butler, supra note 116, at 39 (arguing that the recognition of 
power is “the very precondition of a politically engaged critique”). 
 132. See Bernstein, supra note 112, at 1620 (explaining importance of Archimedean point to 
modernist philosophy). 
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both socially and culturally constructed in and through relations of power 
and subjection and capable of critique and of critically directed self-
constitution and social transformation.”133 According to Allen, the feminist 
concept of the relational self suggests that “mutual, reciprocal, 
communicative social interactions are necessary for the formation, 
sustenance, and repair of the self.”134 Consequently, if a set of social 
relationships and interactions are not mutual and reciprocal, if one 
individual or entity manipulates or deceives another for the former’s 
benefit, then we can reasonably denounce the relationship as unjust or 
destructive to autonomy.
135
 Unquestionably, many individuals, struggling 
to develop capacities for autonomy and social critique, confront far greater 
obstacles than did our friend Harold. But for Harold or anyone else, the 
repudiation of modernism and the recognition of the relational 
(postmodern) self can facilitate autonomy and social critique. If we do not 
understand that the self is relational, if we insist that autonomy requires 
independence, separation, and self-sufficiency, then critique might never 
get off the ground. Isolation does not produce social change. 
Second, if we have the capability for social critique, as I suggest, then 
we should rethink many jurisprudential concepts, particularly in 
constitutional law.
136
 For example, we should stop conceiving of 
constitutional rights as protecting atomistic individuals from state power. 
Instead, we should envision rights as facilitating constructive and creative 
relationships and protecting against destructive or distorting relationships. 
This perspective might sometimes engender limits on government, but 
might also encourage government restrictions on private entities, like 
corporations, which can manipulate individuals and diminish their 
autonomy.
137
 
In short, we now can see the possibility of postmodern social critique 
and jurisprudence. Such a possibility does not mean that we enjoy a 
sovereign power to remake the world, like a modernist Harold. Rather, we 
are empowered to criticize, to act autonomously, and to work with others 
to change the world. To be sure, change is not as easy as writing a law 
review article. Progressive political and social change is difficult, partly 
 
 
 133. Allen, supra note 97, at 177. 
 134. Allen, Transformation, supra note 101, at 240. 
 135. Allen, supra note 97, at 17779. Allen developed her critical theory by synthesizing 
Foucault, Jürgen Habermas, Butler, and Seyla Benhabib. Id. at 110. 
 136. See Nedelsky, supra note 13, at 38 (arguing to integrate relational concepts into legal 
system). 
 137. See id. at 98 (arguing to protect “constructive relationships”); id. at 118 (arguing against 
focusing on “mythic independence” from the state). 
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because many individuals do not welcome such change. But we should not 
be deceived: Change is possible. 
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